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Political Mobilisation as the Trigger of Xenophobic 
Violence in Post-Apartheid South Africa
Jean Pierre Misago, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
What triggers xenophobic violence in South Africa?  By answering this deceivingly simple but critical question, this paper high -
lights an often-missed empirical factor and key element in the xenophobic violence causal chain: mobilization. Drawing from
extensive, comparative empirical data and global literature, the paper argues that, while macro and micro-level socio-economic
and political circumstances are important elements in heightening tensions and creating collective discontent, anger and re -
sentment towards foreign nationals, it is the mobilization of this discontent and not the discontent itself that triggers xenopho -
bic attacks in locations where they occur. Mobilization is the vital connective tissue between discontent and xenophobic vio -
lence. Local violence entrepreneurs use well-known mobilization techniques, including haranguing and parochial patronage, to
stir crowds into targeted and well-organized violent attacks of foreign nationals in South Africa. While this argument is in line
with existing theoretical approaches that emphasize mobilization as a key causal factor in the occurrence of collective violence,
the paper provides useful solid empirical backing these still hesitant approaches require to consolidate their explanatory value
and efficacy.
Keywords: xenophobic violence, collective violence, mobilization, collective discontent
Xenophobic  violence  has  become  a  perennial  feature  in
post-apartheid  South  Africa (Landau 2011). Indeed, since
1994, tens of thousands of people have been harassed, at-
tacked, or killed because of their status as outsiders or for-
eign nationals (Misago 2016a). The African Centre for Migra-
tion and Society (ACMS) has a record of 482 verified xeno-
phobic incidents from 1994 to October 2018, 25 of which
took  place  between  January  and  October  2018  (ACMS
2018). Xenophobic violence generally refers to any acts of
collective violence (by local communities, groups or crowds)
targeted at foreign nationals or “outsiders” because of their
being foreign or strangers. It is an explicit targeting of foreign
nationals or outsiders for violent attacks, regardless of any
other material, political, cultural or social forces that might
be at play (Dodson 2010). The main characteristics of this
violence  in  South  Africa  include  murder, assaults  causing
grievous bodily  harm and burning, looting, robbery, arson,
displacement, intimidation and threats (Misago 2017). 
In response to the ongoing violence, academics, political
leaders, migrant rights organisations and other analysts have
sought to identify and explain its causal factors. Scholarly
analysis  has  led  to  competing  explanatory  models  mostly
emphasising broad and structural economic, political, histori-
cal and psychosocial factors. Economic explanations empha-
sise competition over scarce resources and opportunities be-
tween citizens and the increasing number of poor African mi-
grants (Monson 2015). Political, historical and institutional
explanations put forward the country’s past and current polit-
ical and institutional configurations as the key drivers of the
violence. The factors often cited here include the legacy of
apartheid and the failure of post-apartheid nation-building
efforts (Landau 2011). Psycho-social  explanations empha-
sise cultural stereotyping resulting from the South Africans’
new direct contact with foreign Africans (Dodson 2010) and
the culture of violence entrenched by the country’s history of
militarism and historical trauma cultivated by the apartheid
legacy (Lau, Seedat, and Suffla 2010). In addition to these
broad structural factors, other analyses have added local so-
cio-economic and political dynamics to the mix, arguing that
the most proximate causes of the violence are found in the
political economy and micro-politics localised in many of the
country’s towns, townships and informal settlements (see for
example Misago 2011; Nieftagodien 2011; Monson 2015).
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While these explanations implicitly  claim that the causal
factors they put forward are necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for the occurrence of xenophobic violence, they “falter
when faced with empirical or logical interrogation” (Landau
2011, 3). Indeed, while there can be no doubt that the driv-
ers of xenophobic violence in South Africa are inevitably mul-
tiple and embedded in a complex interplay of the country’s
past  and  present  macro-  and  micro-level  (political, social
and economic) factors, the main weakness of these explana-
tions lies in their inability to establish a direct empirical link
between these certainly common and longstanding factors
and the occurrence of violence in specific communities at
specific times. These explanations fail to identify and clarify
processes through which  conditions  and motives  translate
into  or  become expressed  in  collective  violent  attacks. In
other words, they fail to identify the specific or real triggers of
violence.
With the above in mind, and drawing on both global theo-
retical and empirical literature and extensive and compara-
tive  qualitative  data  from long-term research within  South
Africa, this paper aims to contribute to on-going efforts to
provide a comprehensive empirically based and theoretically
informed causal explanation of xenophobic violence in South
Africa. It does so by asking and answering a deceptively sim-
ple  but  critical  question:  “what  triggers  xenophobic  vio-
lence?” By answering this question, the paper highlights an
often-missed empirical factor and key element in the xeno-
phobic violence causal  chain:  mobilisation. It  argues that,
while  macro- and micro-level  socio-economic and political
circumstances are  important  elements  in  heightening  ten-
sions and creating collective discontent, anger and resent-
ment towards foreign nationals, it is the mobilisation of this
discontent – and not the discontent itself – that triggers col-
lective violent attacks. Mobilisation is the vital connective tis-
sue between discontent and collective violence. As a trigger,
mobilisation helps explain the pathways from collective dis-
content and/or instrumental motives to collective violent ac-
tion. 
This argument is in line with still hesitant theoretical ap-
proaches that emphasise mobilisation as a key causal factor
in  the  occurrence  of  collective  action/behaviour.  Indeed,
even though it  is  increasingly  recognised as an important
factor, the idea that mobilisation is the trigger of collective vi-
olence remains restricted to the level of conceptual and the-
oretical  discussions  and  has  not  really  been  sufficiently
tested with empirical research. These theoretical approaches
still lack the solid empirical backing needed to consolidate
their explanatory value or efficacy. By explaining how mobili-
sation processes trigger xenophobic violence in South Africa,
this paper is hopefully a useful step in this regard.
For present purposes, mobilisation broadly refers to all ac-
tivities, interactions and processes aimed at recruiting and
persuading individuals and groups to participate in a collec-
tive action: the process of bringing potential participants into
action. It focuses on the instigators of violence or “violence
entrepreneurs” (Tilly 2003) and their ability to assemble in-
dividuals and persuade them to participate in a collective
action for a seemingly common/collective goal even if, often
or at least in the case of xenophobic violence in South Africa,
the motives of instigators are not always the same as those
of  followers  (Misago  2017).  Mobilisation  refers  to  the
process through which violence entrepreneurs and followers
“seal  temporary  loyalties  around  a  violent  enterprise”
(Guichaoua 2013, 70).
1. Methodology 
The paper draws heavily on extensive comparative qualitative
empirical data collected by the African Centre for Migration
and Society (ACMS) at the University of the Witwatersrand
since 2008, specifically data collected in sixteen locations
across four South African provinces most affected by xeno-
phobic violence (Gauteng, Western Cape, Eastern Cape and
KwaZulu Natal).
The aim of this on-going research is to explain the occur-
rence  of  xenophobic  violence, as  opposed  to  generalised
and prevailing xenophobic sentiments. In other words, the re-
search focus is not so much to explain xenophobic attitudes,
in the sense of disliking or distrusting foreigners and other
“outsiders” (Crush 2001) as to identify  immediate triggers
and conditions under which these sentiments are expressed
in organised mass violence: why long-standing negative atti-
tudes suddenly turn into violent attacks; why certain groups
are targeted; and why violence breaks out in some areas and
not in others. To achieve this goal, the study adopts the “most
similar systems” approach, selecting research sites affected
by violence and others that did not experience violence de-
spite having similar socio-economic dynamics. The approach
is  informed  by  the  conviction  that  “no  enquiry  into  riots
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should  fail  to  account  for  their  absence” (Horowitz  2001,
xiv).
At each site, research teams (of which the author is team
leader and project principal investigator) conduct in-depth,
qualitative  interviews  with  South  African  residents, foreign
nationals residing in the same locations, relevant government
officials, community leaders, and representatives of civil so-
ciety organisations operating in the selected areas. In addi-
tion to individual in-depth interviews, the teams conduct an
average of two focus group discussions at each research site.
To date more than 760 participants have been interviewed in
the scope of the study.
2. Perspectives on Mobilisation as a Key Determinant of 
Collective Violence
The concept of mobilisation as a key determinant of collec-
tive action emerged as a response to the shortcomings of
the earlier deprivation approach that offered theoretical and
empirical explanations emphasising underlying structural so-
cio-economic  and political  issues  as  necessary  and suffi-
cient conditions for the occurrence of collective violence. The
central argument of this approach, also known as the  dis-
content  model (Snyder  1978)  or  “volcanic”  model  (Aya
1979), is that generalised real or perceived political, social
or  economic  deprivation  leads  to  collective  discontent  or
mass anger that eventually erupts in collective violence (Aya
1979). Relevant theories include: i) functionalism, which ex-
plains collective violence in terms of purpose and motives
rather than causes (Durkheim, in Coser 1967); ii)  realistic
group conflict theory, which posits that violent conflict  be-
tween groups is rooted in a clash of competing group inter-
ests, be they economic, social or status-based (Brief et al.
2005;  Sniderman, Hagerndoorn, and Prior  2004);  and iii)
relative  deprivation  theory, which  suggests  that  discontent
arising from a perception of relative deprivation is the basic,
instigating condition for collective violence (Gurr 1970; Sny-
der  1978;  Horowitz  2001;  Conteh-Morgan 2004;  Fortman
2005). 
Despite its popularity the deprivation model (and the theo-
ries it represents) has been heavily criticised on methodolog-
ical and empirical grounds, particularly for failing to address
important  substantive  questions  concerning  how  discon-
tented individuals come to undertake collective action. The
model  fails  to  explain  either  the  links  between  individual
propensities and the occurrence of collective violent events
or the passage from individual and collective discontent to
collective  violent  action (Aya 1979), particularly  given the
non-conclusive  evidence  on  attitude-behaviour  consistency
(Wicker 1969, cited in Snyder 1978; see also Kraus 1995). 
These limitations led to the formulation of the mobilisa-
tion-based explanation which, according  to  its  proponents
(see for example Snyder 1978), is able to address questions
that are logical necessities in explaining collective violence
but underemphasised in most other theories or explanations:
“how does collective violence occur?”(ibid.). Many scholars
have  argued  that  without  showing  exactly  how  prevailing
structural (socio-economic and political) conditions lead to
the occurrence of collective violence or action, explanations
demonstrate  only  correlation  rather  than  causality.  For
Hechter, Friedman, and Appelbaum (1982, 431) for exam-
ple, these explanations have a hallowed place in the socio-
logical literature but:
What has been missing is a simple explanation of their efficacy.
Too frequently analysis has halted with the demonstration of
correlations between measured variables and the actual occur-
rence of events and types of collective action. By providing a
theory [or an explanation] that lays bare the elementary mech-
anisms  of  collective  action  we  can  begin  to  move  beyond
simple correlation towards the harder task of understanding [or
establishing causality].
Informed mainly by the social movements literature, per-
spectives on the relevance of mobilisation in the occurrence
of collective violence are most visible in theoretical discus-
sions that emerged in the 1970s to oppose or complement
earlier  theoretical  explanations  (see  for  example  Gamson
1975; Snyder 1978; Aya 1979). Indeed theories grouped in
what I  term “the mobilisation approach” (such as resource
mobilisation, rational choice, elite manipulation) were devel-
oped partly as a response to growing dissatisfaction with the
increasingly perceptible conceptual and empirical limitations
of  the  then  dominant  “deprivation-grievances-discontent”
theoretical approaches. 
The core argument of the mobilisation approach to collec-
tive  violence, also  referred  to  as  the  political  model (Aya
1979), is that it is the organisation or mobilisation of discon-
tent that triggers collective violence rather than simply the
discontent  or  grievances  themselves.  “Organizational  vari-
ables are crucial in transforming the subjective states into
collective events and […] violence would not generally occur
in situations which are comparable except for the absence of
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such  mechanisms” (Snyder  1978, 514). Recognising  that
there is always enough discontent in any society to enable
extensive collective violent action, many scholars (for exam-
ple Tilly 1975; Oberschall 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1977)
have concluded that the mobilisation of discontent is a cen-
tral explanatory variable for the occurrence of collective vio-
lence, particularly insofar as it helps to account for how indi-
viduals come to participate collectively in large-scale events
(at the same time and place, and often for the same pur-
pose) (see detailed discussion in Snyder 1978). Confirming
the theoretical centrality of mobilisation and making discon-
tent  or  grievances  an  important  but  weaker  component,
some  analysts  (for  example  McCarthy  and  Zald  1977;
Smelser 1963) have gone even further to argue that griev-
ances and discontent are often defined, created, and manip-
ulated by violence entrepreneurs intent on benefiting from
the collective hostility. For others, even genuine collective dis-
content and grievances need mobilisation to trigger a collec-
tive violence incident the same way dry grass needs a spark
to ignite fire (Gleason 2011). Similarly, Bond (2007, 29) ar-
gues that “having a large number of distressed [or discon-
tented] group members is not enough to foment collective vi-
olence. A group’s members  must  be marshaled, organized
and focused” to be able to carry out a targeted collective ac-
tion. 
I share the opinion that a targeted collection action is not
possible  without  mobilisation.  An  organiser,  generally  a
leader  with  some  kind  of  moral  authority  and  legitimacy,
makes the call that brings together individuals, members of a
collectivity or just sympathisers and turns or converts them
into actual  participants. Referring  to  ethnic  violence, Wolff
(2007, cited in Vermeersch 2011,  1) reminds us that while
this does not mean that the grievances invoked by such col-
lective action are not deeply felt prior to the process of mo-
bilisation, or that the population is not genuinely or sponta-
neously angered by “the ethnic other”, “the step from griev-
ances to ethnic strife should never simply be regarded as an
automatic linear chain from cause to consequence”. Griev-
ance, anger, hatred and discontent require “political  mobi-
lization via association, formal or informal, to be galvanized
into action” (Aya 1979, 49). 
3. Mobilisation as a Trigger of Xenophobic Violence in 
South Africa
While scholars identify various techniques and processes in-
volved in mobilisation for collective violence, they share the
opinion  that  the  success  of  mobilisation  depends  on  the
ability  of  the organiser(s), mobiliser(s)  or  leader(s)  to  de-
velop a set of ideas that resonate with widely held beliefs
(Gamson 1975). Organisers mobilise  and convert  affected
group members and sympathisers into actual participants by
casting a situation as a collective problem worthy of atten-
tion and by fostering a belief that the identified collective ac-
tion or solution will effectively resolve the problem and over-
come the perceived injustice (ibid.). By crystallising the be-
lief in a collective problem and related corrective collective
action, organisers are able to gain the both ideological and
behavioural  support  needed  to  spur  crowds  into  action
(Smelser 1963). It is also important to note, as Bond (2007)
argues, that mobilisation facilitating collective violence tar-
gets not only potential participants but all group and com-
munity  members, to  seek  support  for  and  solidarity  with
those who eventually perpetrate the actual violence. Popular
support and approval facilitate mobilisation for the identified
violent collective action by rationalising it as a loyal service
to the group or community or necessary collective self-pro-
tection  against  malicious  others  intent  on  destroying  the
community and its way of life (ibid.).
In South Africa, instigators use different mobilisation tech-
niques  to  trigger  xenophobic  violence  in  their  respective
communities.  These  include:  “haranguing”  and  inciting
crowds  during  mass  community  meetings, spreading  pur-
posely  engineered  rumours,  appeals  to  the  community’s
sense of solidarity and right to self-defence, setting examples
and  asking  community  members  to  join, and  even  hiring
groups of youths to carry out attacks. In the following, I de-
scribe and discuss examples of these processes and tech-
niques drawn from primary data from different research sites.
The  discussion  provides  extensive  empirical  evidence  that
mobilisation is indeed the trigger of xenophobic attacks.
3.1 Haranguing by Community Leaders in Mass Meetings
Analysis of events that immediately precede violence re-
veals that in most cases, violent attacks on foreign nationals
are  triggered  by  haranguing  by  community  leaders  during
purposely  called  mass  community  meetings.  Community
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leaders (formal or informal) call mass community meetings
in which attacks are decided upon and carefully organised.
In those meetings, the leaders’ role in triggering the violence
is twofold: i) haranguing and stirring crowds into action, and
ii) leading by example by directly participating in and com-
manding  attacks.  Examples  from  Alexandra,  Diepsloot,
Ramaphosa  and  Itireleng  illustrate  how  this  mobilisation
technique triggered violent attacks on foreign nationals.
In Alexandra, a township in Johannesburg that has experi-
enced multiple episodes of xenophobic violence since 1994,
mobilising for the May 2008 violence against foreign nation-
als was the work of the “comrades” (a term commonly used
for local community leaders). The comrades called a mass
community meeting where the decision to attack and remove
foreign nationals from the area was formally endorsed and
after  which  attacks  immediately  started.  One  respondent
summarised views shared by many: 
The decision to remove foreigners was taken at a meeting held
at the police station. Police then said “you as the community,
what do you say when a person has come to your area and do
whatever he wants, what do you do?” There was also a com-
munity leader who issued a statement that people must decide
on how they deal with someone who has entered his kraal and
taken his  cattle. This  statement  for  me started the violence.
People  agreed  with  community  leaders  that  foreigners  must
leave. People said “from this very moment we are going to re-
move foreigners. We no longer want them here.” Then attacks
immediately started.
This account clearly indicates that attacks on foreign nation-
als in Alexandra were not a spontaneous outbreak, as re-
ported in the media, but rather a result of deliberate commu-
nity organising and mobilisation by local leaders (see also
Monson and Arian 2011). There is no doubt about the defin-
ing role played by mobilisation in triggering the attacks. Mo-
bilisation in this case involved the ability and active efforts of
community leaders to bring people together in a mass meet-
ing and incite them to action by convincing them that attack-
ing and expelling “dangerous” foreigners was the only option
available, and that they had the power to do so. The structure
of the violence itself underlines the degree to which attacks
were organised and carefully planned. As Monson and Arian
(2011) indicate, despite the unavoidable chaos, a deliberate
structure remained discernible in the evictions. For example,
they cite one respondent stating that the expropriated homes
were in at least some cases redistributed in an organised
fashion: 
Only people who did not have houses were selected to occupy
these houses. If you said you did not have a house, you needed
someone  else  to  back  your  claim  that  you  did  not  have  a
house. This is how houses were allocated. There were people
who were  collected from under bridges and they were given
houses (ibid., 34).
In Diepsloot, another township in Johannesburg that has wit-
nessed repeated  xenophobic  attacks, mobilisation  for  vio-
lence against foreign nationals occurred – as in Alexandra –
in  community  meetings  organised  by  the  local  leadership
committee or the “comrades”. In 2008 for example, the com-
rades called a mass community meeting and convinced local
residents that attacking and removing foreigners from the ar-
eas was a “matter of survival”. One respondent for example
stated: 
During the meeting, the comrades informed people that  for-
eigners mug people going to work in the morning, kill them and
put them inside the dirty bins and for that reason the commit-
tee and people were saying they no longer want any foreigners.
Attacks that took place in Diepsloot were common when look-
ing at other areas. But in Diepsloot it was an issue of survival,
foreigners were killing us.
Attacks immediately followed that meeting. “They started at-
tacking after the meeting on the same day. They started at-
tacking at our house because it is known that Shonas [Zim-
babweans] stay here,” said one foreign national and victim of
the violence. To make sure that all foreigners were found, the
comrades  directly  leading  the  attacks  asked  all  residents
staying  with  foreigners  to  supply  the  relevant  information.
Asked how people knew that a person was not a South Africa
citizen, one respondent stated: “The committee told the com-
munity that if you are staying with a foreigner you must tell
them so that they can deal with them.” Respondents were
unanimous that the comrades led the attacks. One of them
for example responded when asked who the people leading
the attacks were: “It was the comrades and the community
joined in since it was something discussed at the meeting
and led by the comrades.”
Mobilisation played a critical role in triggering the violence
in  Diepsloot. Without  the comrades calling the community
meeting and persuading people that attacking and expelling
foreigners was a legitimate, urgent need, a “matter of sur-
vival”, attacks would probably not have taken place. It is also
important to note that in addition to rhetorically inciting ac-
tion, the comrades also mobilised participants by setting an
example, by directly leading and participating in the violence.
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The processes that led to the 2008 xenophobic violence in
Ramaphosa, a township in Ekurhuleni municipality, similarly
confirm the direct triggering effect of mobilisation. Indeed all
respondents  reported  that  attacks  on  foreign  nationals
started directly after community leaders (the local ward com-
mittee) called a public meeting and urged community mem-
bers to attack and expel foreigners in the name of self-de-
fence. Asked how violence started, one respondent who par-
ticipated in the attacks stated: “It was a normal community
meeting called by our leaders. It was said we must attack
Amashangane [foreigners] because they are fighting us. We
must go and fight them also. We went to them straight and
war  broke out. We killed some and others ran away.” One
ward  committee  member  (a  community  leader)  confirmed
that the committee called a meeting and urged for retaliation
and self-defence against foreigners supposedly killing locals.
In his own words: 
On Friday, they [foreigners]  started beating locals;  they killed
one person. On Saturday evening the killers who had disap-
peared came back to continue their job; they were beating up
locals because they were beaten in Alex. On Sunday morning
we tried to defend ourselves; we came together to decide to
chase  them  away  because  they  were  killing  us.  […]  what
happened? We beat them; we were not going to talk to them
nicely;  we went  where  they  were  gathered;  we went  to  their
shacks and burnt them. 
According to some respondents, however, the story  of  for-
eigners beating and killing locals was just a rumour. The local
ward councillor for instance was not aware of any killings of
South Africans by foreigners. He stated when asked about it:
“It is the first time we hear this. I think the self-defence story
was fed to the community by the ring-leaders we are unfortu-
nately not able to identify.” It appears that mass violent at-
tacks on foreign nationals in Ramaphosa were triggered and
made possible by the mobilisation (by local leaders) of col-
lective discontent caused by a rumour that crystallised and
confirmed the belief that the presence of foreigners repre-
sented an eminent danger to the lives and livelihoods of all
local community members. 
The mobilisation processes that triggered violence against
foreigners in Itireleng, an informal settlement in the Tshwane
Metropolitan Municipality, resemble those described in the
previous cases. Respondents reported that attacks immedi-
ately followed a mass community  meeting called by com-
rades in the night of 17 February 2008. Respondents were
unanimous that it was in this meeting that the final decision
to attack and drive foreigners out was taken. At the meeting,
community members agreed to the chairperson’s proposal to
remove foreigners because of all the problems they purport-
edly  caused in  the community. Judging  from how respon-
dents described the meeting, it is clear that the comrades
had already decided to expel foreigners and the meeting was
called to seek community approval and active participation.
Asked how violence started, one respondent stated: 
One evening a loud speaker by comrades from the gate called
a meeting. A regular community meeting to discuss community
problems. The chairperson opened the meeting by telling the
crowds that there is only one issue on the agenda, that of for-
eigners. The chairperson asked the meeting if it wasn’t a good
idea if  foreigners  left  the  area. The entire  meeting answered
“Yeeees, foreigners must leave!” The later part of the meeting
was discussing complaints about foreigners. The decision for
them to be removed was taken by the chairperson very early in
the meeting.
Led by the comrades, attacks on foreign nationals started
immediately after that meeting. “From there and there peo-
ple wasted no time; they moved from the meeting straight to
houses where they knew foreigners were living and took them
out,” one respondent stated. Clearly, this discussion demon-
strates the defining role mobilisation by community leaders
played in triggering attacks on foreign nationals in the area –
and  securing  mass  participation. Again, through  rhetorical
means (haranguing and spreading rumours about the danger
the presence of foreigners purportedly presents to the com-
munity), and by leading by example, the comrades incited
the crowds and stirred them into action. 
Beyond the South African context, haranguing and other
forms of rhetorical mobilisation (such as face-to-face inter-
actions  with  potential  participants,  dialogues  with  group
members, mass media, etc.)  are  well-known and effective
techniques used to mobilise community members into col-
lective violent action (Guichaoua 2013; Smelser 1963). In
particular,  many  scholars  (for  example  Smelser  1963;
Horowitz 2001; Das 2007) have documented the power of
rumours in many different contexts. Rumours create a sense
of endangered collectivity, which becomes easily mobilisable
for  collective  action  usually  in  the  name  of  self-defence
(Horowitz 2001). Through different forms of interaction, vio-
lence entrepreneurs spread rumours narratives or discourses
that “tailor ‘master cleavages’, breeding readiness to violence
among  followers  …” (Guichaoua  2013, 73;  see  also  Das
2007 and Horowitz 2001). Like in the Ramaphosa example
above, such discourses and rumours foster enmity and fear,
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polarise identities and “make the physical elimination of the
vilified, and often dehumanised, enemy a feasible option in
their followers’ eyes” (Guichaoua 2010, 9). A group’s mem-
bers are easily mobilised to support and participate in col-
lective  violence  by  these  polarising  discourses, which  be-
come legitimation processes that deem the targeted group
and its members as dangerous, immoral, or sub-human, and
hence killable (Bond 2007).
3.2 Patronage in Masiphumelele and Mamelodi
Masiphumelele  township  in  Cape  Town  experienced  two
waves of violent attacks on foreign nationals (in 2006 and
2008). Respondents unanimously indicated that both waves
were perpetrated by groups of youths “hired” by local busi-
ness owners unhappy about the competition created by the
increasing number of foreign-owned businesses. On both oc-
casions, local business-owners organised internal meetings
in which they decided to mobilise local youths to attack and
chase  away  foreign  nationals, particularly  those  operating
businesses in the location. Talking about the 2006 violence,
one respondent stated: “What they [local business owners]
did, they spoke to these silly boys whom we refer to as thugs
in the area to go and loot and vandalise Somali shops. That’s
how the 2006 violence started.”
In 2008, local business owners similarly organised a meet-
ing at a local community hall after which attacks began. As
one respondent stated: “There was a meeting organised by
business people, they used young people to attack the for-
eigners.” A former community leader confirmed: “A meeting
was called by business people; they called the community
and other business people. They were not happy that foreign-
ers’ prices are cheap; they are friendly to their customers and
give good service. They organised boys in the community hall
to attack and loot the Somalis shops.” All respondents were
well aware that local business people were behind the vio-
lence even if they were not directly involved in the attacks. As
one  stated:  “Yes, it  is  not  business  people  who  loot  the
Baraka [foreigners] shops. What they do, which is important
is that they ‘buy’ the youth to loot the shops of Baraka and
evict them. They target unemployed youth to do this on their
behalf.” 
Patronage  was also  at  play  in  Mamelodi, a  township  in
Tshwane  that  experienced  xenophobic  violence  in  2008,
2014, 2015 and 2017. In 2017, violence against  foreign
nationals broke out in Mamelodi and other parts of Tshwane
Metropolitan Municipality following a call made by Mamelodi
Concerned Residents for  a march against  the presence of
foreign nationals in the country. Respondents indicated that
the violence in 2015 was organised and led by the Phomo-
long Residents Association (an informal community leader-
ship group). 
While the Phomolong Residents Association did not openly
admit to being behind the attacks on foreign shops, inter-
views strongly indicated their involvement. Indeed, Associa-
tion representatives admitted they organised violent “service
delivery protests” that led to attacks on foreign-owned busi-
nesses. One stated: “We need the protesters to make our
point, but when they are hungry they go and get food from
foreign shops to eat or take home to cook; and if shops here
are closed they go to shops in other locations.”
In sum, local business owners and leaders triggered violent
attacks  on  foreign  nationals  in  Masiphumelele  and
Mamelodi using what  Guichaoua (2013) terms  “parochial
patronage”, a  well  documented mobilisation technique in-
volving hiring thugs or “area boys” to carry out the defined
act of violence and offering participants material rewards in
the form of money or tacit authorisation to loot. 
In sum, the discussion above indicates that it is mobilisa-
tion that triggers mass violent attacks on foreign nationals in
South Africa. We also learn from this discussion that commu-
nity  leaders  and/or  local  violence entrepreneurs use well-
known mobilisation techniques and processes to stir crowds
into targeted and well-organised collective violent acts. The
role of mobilisation in triggering xenophobic violence is even
more obvious when one examines the reasons why such vio-
lence did not occur in potentially volatile locations (for exam-
ple  Madelakufa  1  and  Setswetla)  that  are  geographically
close and socio-economically similar to violence-affected ar-
eas (see the most similar systems approach in the method-
ology  section).  Indeed,  as  I  argue  elsewhere  (Misago
2016b), it is the absence of successful mobilisation that ex-
plains the absence of violence in those locations. By thwart-
ing internal and external mobilisation attempts, community
leaders and the local authorities (including the police) were
able to prevent violence in those locations (ibid.). 
The analytical understanding of mobilisation and its effect
triggering collective violence is not only missing in the litera-
ture on xenophobic violence in South Africa but  it  is  also
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given insufficient consideration in the general literature and
empirical research on collective violence. The real processes
that trigger an act of collective violence do not seem to have
attracted sufficient attention in research on determinants or
key elements of the collective violence causal chain. This gap
in the empirical literature can perhaps be attributed to the
still widely held assumption that grievances accumulate and
tensions or collective discontent boil up and automatically
explode into collective violence. Much attention is  paid to
underlying conditions without explaining how they translate
into collection violence. This assumption unfortunately per-
sists despite regular reminders that violence is not an auto-
matic outgrowth of conflict (Brubaker and Latin 1998) and
that, as mentioned earlier, even “dry grass” needs a “spark”
to ignite fire (Gleason 2011).
Even though it is increasingly recognised as an important
factor, the discussion of mobilisation as trigger of collective
violence remains conceptual and theoretical (as briefly dis-
cussed earlier)  and has not  really  been thoroughly  tested
with empirical research (Guichaoua 2013 is an exception in
this regard). The focus of theoretical positions emphasising
the critical role mobilisation plays in the occurrence of col-
lective violence seems to have been on debunking the merits
of  competing  theoretical  approaches  rather  than  building
solid  methodological  and  analytical  tools  to  adequately
identify and understand its  (mobilisation)  forms, variables,
processes and relevance. While these theoretical  premises
thus far make logical sense (in my opinion at least), they still
lack solid and sufficient empirical backing that would consol-
idate their explanatory value or efficacy. Snyder (1978), one
of the proponents of the mobilisation approach to collective
violence admits that processes of interaction between indi-
viduals and groups, especially the mechanisms of recruiting
potential  participants, converting  them into  actual  partici-
pants and maintaining their commitment remain important
research  questions.  By  explaining  how  mobilisation  pro-
cesses trigger xenophobic violence in South Africa, this paper
is hopefully a useful contribution towards filling this gap.
4. Conclusion
This paper adds a new and critical element or key determi-
nant to the analysis and understanding of the causal factors
of xenophobic violence in South Africa, and highlights the of-
ten-missed but crucial triggering role played by mobilisation.
It argues that xenophobic violence in South Africa is triggered
by mobilisation of collective discontent invariably generated
by a wide range of different factors (such as relative depriva-
tion, beliefs, rumours, etc.). It is important to note that mo-
bilisation explains the pathways from collective discontent to
collective (xenophobic) violence but not the origins of that
discontent. 
This addition is theoretically important and practically use-
ful. Theoretically, it supports the still hesitant premise that it
is the mobilisation of discontent – and not the discontent it-
self – that triggers acts of collective violence. Practically, this
addition is useful as a significant step towards a clear under-
standing of all key determinants of xenophobic violence in
South Africa. Such an understanding is necessary for rele-
vant institutions to design appropriate measures/responses
to stop on-going violence and/or prevent future recurrences. 
While  I  believe  that  the case  of  xenophobic  violence  in
South Africa provides important preliminary support for my
argument, and hopefully a useful empirical entry into the role
of  mobilisation in triggering similar  types of  collective vio-
lence, further investigation and specifically more comparative
research is needed to consolidate empirical evidence neces-
sary for building the analytical tools that can help to ade-
quately identify and better understand the forms, variables
and processes of a successful mobilisation. Further, recog-
nising that no single factor can adequately account for all
determinants of collective violence, this paper acknowledges
that mobilisation does not function in isolation. It requires in-
teraction with other determinants to produce an act of tar-
geted collective violence. The argument that  collective vio-
lence is triggered by the mobilisation of collective discontent
implies  the indispensable  presence of  such discontent. To
continue  with  Gleason’s  analogy  that  “dry  grass  needs  a
spark to ignite fire” (2011) (discontent needs mobilisation to
trigger collective violence), the inverse is equally true: “the
spark needs dry grass to ignite fire” (or mobilisation needs
discontent to trigger collective violence). I also argue else-
where that mobilisation requires a favourable political oppor-
tunity structure to succeed in triggering xenophobic violence
(Misago 2016b). I agree with Sen (2008) that approaches to
explaining violence should avoid isolationist models because
individual factors, no matter how important they are, cannot
provide an adequate understanding of the causation of such
a complex phenomenon in isolation from other societal con-
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ditions and processes. As Sen argues, “A solitarist approach
is, in general, a very efficient way of misunderstanding nearly
everyone [or everything] in the world” (2008, 6).
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